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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BERNARDO BRAVO-VAZQUEZ,
aka BERNARDO BRAVO-VASQUEZ,
aka BERNARDO BRAVO,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48368-2020
Ada County Case No. CR01-19-53721

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Bernardo Bravo-Vazquez failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, upon his third
conviction for felony driving under the influence?
ARGUMENT
Bravo-Vazquez Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
The state charged Bravo-Vazquez with felony DUI. (R., pp.29-30.) He pled guilty

pursuant to a plea agreement. (R., pp.33-44; 2/27/20 Tr., p.4, L.6 – p.5, L.9; p.20, L.4 – p.21,
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L.11; p.25, Ls.4-14.) In exchange for his guilty plea, the state agreed not to file a persistent violator
enhancement. (R., p.43; 2/27/20 Tr., p.6, Ls.5-6.) During sentencing, the state recommended a
ten-year sentence, with five years fixed. (10/13/20 Tr., p.10, L.24 – p.11, L.2.) Bravo-Vazquez
recommended a suspended sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (10/13/20 Tr., p.18,
Ls.20-24.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. (R.,
pp.59-69; 10/13/20 Tr., p.26, L.23 – p.27, L.8.) Bravo-Vazquez timely appealed. (R., pp.78-80.)
On appeal, Bravo-Vazquez asserts the district court abused its sentencing discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.) Specifically, he argues the district
court did not exercise reason because it failed to give proper consideration to certain mitigating
evidence. (Id.) His argument is unavailing. The court properly considered the mitigating evidence
presented and imposed a reasonable sentence.
B.

Standard Of Review
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). When a trial
court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
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C.

Bravo-Vazquez Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion
“A sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be

considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628
(quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)). Furthermore, where a
sentence fits within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a
clear abuse of discretion. Id. (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant must show the
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. To establish that the sentence
was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the
sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).
A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citation omitted). The district court has
the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the
sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998)
(holding district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment,
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference to the
trial judge, [the appellate court] will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146
Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).
Bravo-Vazquez concedes that his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)

He was charged with felony DUI, which is punishable by

imprisonment “not to exceed ten (10) years.” I.C. § 18-8005(6)(a). The district court imposed a
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unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. (R., pp.59-69.) Because the sentence imposed
fits within the statutory limits, Bravo-Vazquez “must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho
457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). He cannot do so.
The sentence imposed was reasonable. In fashioning Bravo-Vazquez’s sentence, the court
considered the necessary goals of sentencing—including the protection of society, rehabilitation,
punishment, and deterrence—as well as the nature of the offense, Bravo-Vazquez’s character,
mitigating and aggravating factors, and the criteria for sentencing established in I.C. § 19-2521.
(10/13/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-13.) The court primarily considered the need to protect society. After
being refused alcohol at a gas station, Bravo-Vazquez drove away in a truck. (PSI, p.1.) As he
drove away, he was “swerving all over the road.” (PSI, p.1; 10/13/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.8-11.) He met
decision points on all three standardized field sobriety tests and provided breath alcohol samples
of .204 and .210. (PSI, p.2.) The court noted that despite the state not charging Bravo-Vazquez
with excessive DUI, his blood alcohol level was excessive. (10/13/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.9-14.) Given
his dangerous conduct and the high level of alcohol in his system, the court concluded that BravoVazquez posed a risk to the community. (10/13/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.17-21.)
The court also considered Bravo-Vazquez’s criminal history as it related to the need to
protect society and the related goal of deterrence. This case constituted Bravo-Vazquez’s fifth
lifetime DUI conviction. (PSI, pp.2-3; see 10/13/20 Tr., p.24, Ls.20-21.) He was first convicted
of felony DUI in 2010 and then again in 2014. (PSI, pp.3-5.) In each of those cases he completed
a rider and was placed on probation. (PSI, pp.2-5; see also 10/13/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.14-18.) He
performed poorly on probation. He failed to maintain formal employment, moved without
approval, did not report for scheduled office visits, made no payments towards the cost of his
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supervision, and absconded. (PSI, p.3.) He was still on probation in both the 2010 and 2014 cases
when he committed the instance offense. (PSI, pp.2-5; 10/13/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.22-25.) Because
this case was Bravo-Vazquez’s fifth lifetime DUI and prior sentences had not “gotten [his]
attention,” the court concluded that a term of incarceration was the only way to effectively protect
the community. (10/13/20 Tr., p.24, Ls.20 – p. 25, L.1.)
The court also considered the need for rehabilitation. Even after completing two riders,
Bravo-Vazquez failed to abstain from alcohol. Prior to his DUI conviction in this case, probation
officers found Bravo-Vazquez in possession of alcohol on several occasions, he admitted that he
had consumed alcohol several times on probation, and he provided multiple breath alcohol samples
that confirmed he had consumed alcohol. (PSI, pp.3-5, 20.) The court found that Bravo-Vazquez
did not “understand that he must stop drinking any alcohol.” (10/13/20 Tr., p.24, Ls.8-13; see
- PSI,
p.32.) Thus, the court concluded that another rider was not warranted because neither his four
prior DUI convictions nor his two previous riders had not “gotten his attention.” (10/13/20 Tr.,
p.26, Ls.14-22.) Nonetheless, the court recommended to the Idaho Department of Corrections
(IDOC) that Bravo-Vazquez receive additional substance abuse treatment as well as the “Thinking
for a Change Class” while in custody. (10/13/20 Tr., p.27, Ls.9-18.) Because the district court
properly considered and applied the goals of sentencing, the sentence imposed is reasonable.
Despite the court’s thoroughly reasoned analysis, Bravo-Vazquez contends the court failed
to exercise reason and imposed an excessive sentence in light of mitigating factors such as his
substance abuse, his alleged amenability to treatment, the language barrier that he argues impeded
prior rehabilitative efforts, and his familial support. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-7.) According to
Bravo-Vazquez, proper consideration of these mitigating factors supported a more lenient
sentence. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) His argument is unavailing.
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The district court properly considered and weighed these mitigating factors when it
imposed Bravo-Vazquez’s sentence. (10/13/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-13.) Prior to sentencing, BravoVazquez filed several letters of support penned by family members. (Ex., pp.2-6.) Still, the court
found that relatives were using alcohol in Bravo-Vazquez’s house despite his need for a sober
living environment thereby creating a “very difficult temptation for [him].” (10/13/20 Tr., p.28,
Ls.6-10.) In addition, the court recommended to IDOC that when Bravo-Vazquez is eventually
released into the community that he not be allowed to reside with relatives that are unwilling to
follow the terms of probation. (10/13/20 Tr., p.24, Ls.14-19; p.28, Ls.1-6; PSI, p.5 (recommending
Bravo-Vazquez not live with his brother because they consume alcohol together).)
The court also directly addressed Bravo-Vazquez’s alcohol abuse and amenability to
treatment in fashioning an appropriate sentence. Despite his claim that he was ready to maintain
abstinence (PSI, p.32), the court found that he had minimized the amount of alcohol he consumes
whenever he addressed the court and that he did not “understand that he must stop drinking any
alcohol,” (10/13/20 Tr., p.24, Ls.8-13). To address his substance abuse, the court recommended
that he receive additional treatment while in custody. (10/13/20 Tr., p.27, Ls.9-18.)
Likewise, the court explicitly addressed Bravo-Vazquez’s illiteracy and the language
barrier. The court acknowledged that it was unclear how much of his prior treatment he actually
understood given the language barrier.

(10/13/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.17-20; p.22, Ls.11-17.)

Notwithstanding the language barrier, the court found that treatment is a “two-way street” and that
for his part, Bravo-Vazquez had failed seek help in order to make sure he understood the treatment
he so clearly needed in order to make the necessary changes in his lifestyle. (10/13/20 Tr., p.22,
L.18 – p.23, L.7.) Accordingly, the court recommended that IDOC make accommodations so that
Bravo-Vazquez could complete substance abuse treatment and thinking for a change classes in
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Spanish, or with a Spanish translator or tutor to ensure that he understands the rehabilitation
programming. (10/13/20 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-18.)
Even considering all this mitigating information, the court determined that the sentence of
incarceration was warranted in order for Bravo-Vazquez to receive necessary treatment and to
protect the community. (10/13/20 Tr., p.24, L.20 – p.25, L.1.) Bravo-Vazquez has failed to show
that his sentence is excessive or that the court did not exercise reason simply because it gave less
weight than he desired to the mitigating evidence. See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229
P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (finding no abuse of discretion upon a weighing of mitigating and
aggravating factors in sentencing); State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 (2005)
(emphasizing the discretionary nature of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors).
Accordingly, he has failed to show that the sentence imposed was reasonable.
In sum, the court identified the correct legal standards, correctly perceived sentencing as a
discretionary decision, acted within the boundaries of its discretion, and exercised reason in
imposing Bravo-Vazquez’s sentence. Thus, the court properly exercised its sentencing discretion.
Bravo-Vazquez has failed to show otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 14th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KILEY A. HEFFNER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

JRP/dd

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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